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A Rock and a Hard Place:  
The CWA’s Approach to  




Since its inception, the Communications Workers of America has 
played an important role in lobbying on telecommunication poli-
cies. Its positions, however, have typically put short-term goals of 
job creation ahead of a long-term vision for democratic commu-
nication. Since the AT&T divestiture brought an end to Fordism 
in the telecom industry, the CWA often has been in the conflicted 
position of seeking job security for members in a hostile political 
environment while attempting to develop a just communication 
system in the United States. Typically, the union has chosen the 
former over the latter at the ultimate expense of both. This article 
traces the history of the CWA’s lobbying efforts from the 1984 
divestiture through the wave of media consolidation in the late 
1990s. Trends of technological and structural convergence man-
date that CWA revise its lobbying strategies in order to further a 
vision of democratic communication that will benefit working 
people.   
 
T estifying before Congress in 1988, Morton Bahr, President of the Com-munications Workers of America (CWA), stated “the debate over the future of national telecommunications policy has largely focused on in-tellectual abstractions and concentrated too little on the workers, who are 
the backbone of the industry.” Referring to massive unemployment and other eco-
nomic hardships experienced by union members, Bahr argued that Congress had to 
consider the “human problems created by the divestiture” of AT&T four years ear-
lier (U.S. Congress 1988, 428-9). What Bahr did not adequately acknowledge is 
that simply ensuring that culture industry workers, such as those in the CWA, are 
economically protected is not necessarily advancement for the labor movement as a 
whole. As the telecommunications sector changes structurally and technologically, 
there are growing ramifications of such omissions. 
With its roots as a company union of AT&T telephone workers, the CWA now 
represents the employees of some of the biggest players in a converged, evolving 
culture industry, including members of the Newspaper Guild (TNG) and the Na-
tional Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians (NABET). Since the 
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breakup of AT&T in 1984, changes within the telecommunications and media in-
dustries have worked not only toward the convergence of capital, but the conver-
gence of labor as well. Previous research has shown that this has had the effect of 
bringing media workers together into the same organizations (McKercher 2002). 
However, it has also fundamentally changed the nature of the products and services 
CWA members create. Telephony, cable, Internet, video, and news become further 
intertwined through changes in technology, ownership structures, and distribution; 
meanwhile, the social and cultural implications of being a member of “the tele-
phone union” are in a state of flux. 
This begs the question: What role does the CWA play in shaping the media en-
vironment through policy advocacy? The mainstream of the labor movement, em-
bodied by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) until 1955, and thereafter by 
the AFL-CIO, often has taken a conservative approach as actors within the realm of 
media and telecommunications policy in the United States. They have been hesitant 
to oppose the commercial media system, or have not seen the value or necessity in 
ensuring spaces for non-commercial communication for working-class people. For 
example, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the AFL supported the formation of a 
commercial broadcasting system and argued that unions should work with networks 
to gain favorable programming (McChesney 1993). 
The business unionism of that era, which sought to protect the narrow, short-
term interests of members within the corporate capitalist system, however, was met 
with significant challenges. The Chicago Federation of Labor advocated the reser-
vation of 25 percent of the nation’s radio spectrum for non-commercial use as part 
of a broader broadcast reform movement (McChesney 1993; Godfried 1997). Soon 
thereafter, the workers within the culture industries themselves organized CIO-
affiliated unions, seeing the importance of the cultural apparatus in maintaining a 
worker movement and in producing cultural products that would help sustain 
counter-hegemonic activity. While little research has been done demonstrating the 
extent to which the labor movement pushed for the creation of WPA-sponsored 
cultural programs, it is clear that the presence of an organized labor movement en-
couraged the state to create non-commercial institutions that would, at once, em-
ploy workers and reproduce an organizing culture (Denning 1998). This trend con-
tinued into the early postwar period, as labor played a significant role in advocating 
for policies that helped maintain democracy on the air within the commercial 
broadcasting framework, and pushed for democratic uses of FM spectrum (Fones-
Wolf 2006). 
Thus, although labor in the United States has not fully utilized its potential to 
democratize culture, an alternative approach does exist. In more conservative peri-
ods where labor has been under attack, such as the 1920s and, as this paper will 
show, the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s, unions have been more reluctant to 
take the steps necessary in order to strengthen themselves by shaping the means of 
cultural production. Here, unions find themselves between a rock (the need to pro-
tect the immediate interests of members) and a hard place (the need to change the 
dominant, anti-worker order). Unions within the culture industry are in an even 
more precarious position, because the preservation of their jobs may be viewed as 
dependent on the maintenance of the commercial media system and advanced com-
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munications technologies, both of which perpetuate an anti-labor culture and work 
towards the more efficient accumulation of capital at the expense of working peo-
ple (Rollings 1983; Parenti 1986; Puette 1992; Martin 2004; Robins and Webster 
1983; Dyer-Witheford 1999). 
Given its emergence from a company union and its historical relationship to 
AT&T, the CWA has been unable to negotiate the tension between these two de-
mands in the post-Fordist era effectively. Through testimony and lobbying on Capi-
tol Hill, policy reports, political endorsements, and communication with members, 
the CWA has attempted to shape media policy such that it will prove beneficial for 
its members in the short term. Frequently, this has meant acting in concert with 
employing corporations in their lobbying efforts. Recent controversy over CWA’s 
support for national cable franchising which may lead to redlining, and opposition 
to network neutrality, make understanding this history all the more important for 
those interested in building a democratic media system (Dolber 2007; Cook 2007). 
However, business unionism has not been monolithic throughout the CWA. As 
part of the broader American labor movement, pressures exist for the CWA to act 
as an advocate for social and economic justice, consumer rights, and democratic 
access to information. Since 2003, the CWA has played an active role in media 
reform efforts addressing concentration within mass media industries, but has 
sometimes shied away from staking out positions that might jeopardize the short-
term interests of its members in the telecommunications industry (Dolber 2007).        
Further, the CWA is a complex, transnational organization with members in the 
US and Canada working in many facets throughout the communications industries. 
As affiliates of the CWA, NABET and TNG exercise a high degree of autonomy, 
and have played important roles in the fight for media reform. For TNG, this dates 
back to the organization’s founding during the 1930s, when George Seldes argued 
that reporters should run newspapers themselves, and journalistic practices should 
emphasize the plight of working people (McChesney 2004). More recently, current 
TNG president Linda Foley has been an outspoken critic of media concentration, 
and has repeatedly highlighted the negative impact this has had on the lives of re-
porters, as well as the quality of journalism ( Foley 2005). While more research 
should be undertaken to explore how these internal dynamics have operated histori-
cally and today, this article will focus on the history of lobbying efforts undertaken 
under the CWA banner, not its more independent constituencies. Given these con-
tradictions, the CWA’s lobbying efforts have generally worked to affirm dominant 
understandings of media and technology in order to secure economic protection for 
members, sacrificing the development of working-class culture to intensifying capi-
tal accumulation through a converged communications industry. 
 
 
Early History  
 
Since its earliest years, the CWA embraced an affirmative approach towards the 
corporate implementation of new media technologies. The union grew out of the 
National Federation of Telephone Workers (NFTW), a reconfiguration of 
“employee associations,” or company unions, which flourished after World War I. 
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AT&T supported company unions in order to develop corporate pride through pa-
ternalism, and hinder the organization of independent, antagonistic trade unions in 
the telephone industry. These associations resembled AT&T in their centralized 
structure, leading towards worker atomization (Barbash 1952, 12). 
Management harnessed employee energies in order to promote the corporate 
enterprise as part of the widespread ‘American Plan’ during the 1920s (Brooks 
1977, 25). Bell hired impressionable young workers and used propaganda in an 
extensive training period in order to instill pride in working for a company dedi-
cated to public service (Schact 1977, 24). By the end of the decade, AT&T had 
implemented the use of “human engineering,” through which “human relations for 
the Bell System became a process of indoctrination” (Brooks, 29). In addition, it 
portrayed itself to the public as “Ma Bell…as cheering as the operator’s cheerful 
“May I help you?”, having mastered the science of using images rather than words 
to create a positive emotional relationship to the company among the “irrational” 
public (Ewen 1996, 85-101; 192-6). As a result of these various efforts, Bell work-
ers generally held a positive attitude toward their industry, despite very low wages, 
until the Depression. They had a sense of pride in the public service aspect of their 
employment, having been told that they and their employer shared “one common 
goal” in providing communication services to the public (Schact 1977, 26-7). 
The NFTW formed following the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, which 
outlawed company unions. The controversial law’s constitutional approval by the 
Supreme Court two years later led to the establishment of the NFTW, linking to-
gether of the employee associations at each of the regional Bell companies. Initially 
unaffiliated with either the craft unions in the AFL, or the more radical industrial 
unions in the newly formed CIO, the NFTW straddled the line between being an 
independent employee association and a full-fledged labor union. 
The NFTW made legislative activity in Washington—not organizing—its pri-
mary responsibility, because its members operated in a regulated industry where 
government decisions were influential in determining work conditions (Barbash 
1952, 201; 29). Through this strategy the NFTW sought to advance job, wage and 
pension protection for members. However, union efforts were typically an append-
age to AT&T’s operation (Schact 1977, 179-80). As one of NFTW’s first actions, 
between 1940 and 1943, it fought Western Union’s attempted take over of AT&T’s 
teletypewriter and leased-wire business, which would have eliminated 4,000 tele-
phone jobs. In 1942, the NFTW stood alongside managers at AT&T’s Western 
Electric against the War Department, opposing the government starting communi-
cations repair shops that would compete with the unionized company (Barbash 
1952, 31-2). Labor and management also cooperated in opposing taxes on pension 
plans that did not give employees a vested interest. AT&T argued that meeting 
these standards would force them to drop pensions altogether, thus earning  em-
ployees’ support and creating a consensus within the industry against such a tax.  
Once NFTW locals united with the CIO’s telephone organizing committee to 
form the CWA after a failed strike, the new union worked on several legislative 
issues showing independence from employers. It supported amendments to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and legislation on equal pay for equal work, and opposition to 
the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The CWA also persuaded the Senate Sub-
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committee on Labor-Management Relations to conduct hearings on collective bar-
gaining at AT&T in 1950, and testified that AT&T’s control over the Bell compa-
nies bred poor labor relations. Although the majority report sided with the union, 
the subcommittee affirmed AT&T’s monopoly status, recommending national bar-
gaining between the CWA and AT&T on national issues (Schact 1977, 202-6). 
Support for Democratic politicians became a standard device for the CWA’s 
attempts to gain sway over policy. The CWA was one of the first unions to endorse 
Truman in 1948, while the rest of the labor movement remained skeptical. Presi-
dent Joseph Beirne again called for Truman’s nomination in 1952 while simultane-
ously calling for the repeal of Taft-Hartley, which the National Labor Relations 
Board had vigorously enforced during Truman’s presidency (Barbash 1952, 206). 
Thus, the NFTW and the early CWA developed a Fordist relationship with employ-
ers, forming a consensus with business and politicians around the dominance of 
private enterprise, so long as workers and union members were protected. Since the 
neoliberal turn, however, the CWA has not presented a serious challenge to the 
reemergence of a telecommunications duopoly that is increasingly central to proc-
esses of cultural production and distribution.  
 
 
A Time of Transitions: 1984-1996 
 
“The words to Auld Lang Syne could not have been more apropos for anyone than 
it was for 600,000 former Bell System Employees this New Year. They will never 
forget what it meant to be part of the Bell family,” the CWA News told members in 
1984 (CWA News 1984a, 5). The AT&T divestiture that went into effect on the first 
of the year seemed to spell the end of an era. Under a court order, the Bell System 
had been restructured, forcing 588,000 employees to leave for seven independent 
telephone companies, and splitting the industry into local and long distance seg-
ments. While the breakup of a major corporation may seemingly be a historical 
anomaly within the context of the Reagan-era’s neoliberal ethos, this dramatic 
change in the US telecommunications industry—“the largest corporate shake-up in 
world history”—was a significant byproduct of the transition into a neoliberal po-
litical economy (Schiller 1999, 7). 
The movement into this post-Fordist environment was met with accommoda-
tion, excitement and anxiety by the CWA leadership. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
union stood with AT&T in opposition to the government’s decree (Katz, et al 2003, 
582). Feeling a sense of uncertainty with the break up of Ma Bell, the CWA at-
tempted to secure employee benefit protections through Congress during the transi-
tion. The CWA News instructed members to write to their Senators, in an attempt to 
amend the Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983. While the House 
of Representatives passed a companion bill with protective provisions, the Senate 
version ultimately contained no such amendment. 
President Glen Watts tried to sustain a Fordist relationship between the CWA 
and the new Baby Bell companies, linking worker pride to corporate success. 
“CWA members can take pride in and credit for making the Bell system what it 
became. The same dedication and skills that they bring with them to their new 
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jobs,” he concluded, “will enable the new AT&T and seven telephone companies to 
enter the competitive marketplace with full confidence and without fear of the fu-
ture” (CWA News 1984a, 8). Still, the union projected an attitude of being flexible 
and changing with the times, claiming that “labor must adapt to the future.”  Watts 
warned that “it is essential that unions undertake long term planning strategies,” as 
“information age workers and industries could fall victim to the same maladies 
which…paralyzed the American auto and steel industries” (CWA News 1984b, 10). 
While this rhetoric worked to naturalize the changes that were happening within 
the industry and larger economic landscape, it also indicated a sense of strategic 
thinking. The balance between a national monopoly, the state, and labor had been 
altered fundamentally, leaving workers in the telecommunications industry with the 
short end of the stick throughout the next decade. While AT&T and the Regional 
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), local carriers, pursued policies of downsizing 
and manufacturing plants closed and began to move overseas, CWA representatives 
testified repeatedly before a Democratic Congress in order to secure protections for 
pensions, child care, and social security during the difficult Reagan years. The dis-
integration of Fordism—of which the divestiture was, of course, only one small 
part-- did not only hurt the workforce in direct economic terms. It also had long 
term implications for the development of communications technologies as CEOs 
planned to rework capitalism around private network principles. Post-divestiture, 
telecom companies could not automatically count on CWA support in their lobby-
ing efforts as they had in the past. Changes within the industry—the demands of 
international competition and the desire of the Baby Bells to lift restrictions placed 
on them in the wake of the divestiture—drew mixed reactions from union lobbyists. 
The union typically offered support to whichever companies and policies would 
yield based on the biggest return on short term strategic gains (Katz, et al 2003, 
582). While the union often urged that legislation be modified so that domestic jobs 
were protected, the CWA ultimately allowed for the reconsolidation of the telecom-
munication industry by century’s end. 
 
 
Fighting the MFJ 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the RBOCs wanted the federal government to relax the 
competitive restrictions imposed on the industry after the divestiture. These restric-
tions, established by the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) served consumer 
interests by creating competition in long distance and new information services, 
while enabling regulators to temper local rate increases. As Gene Kimmelman, leg-
islative director of the Consumer Federation of America, told Congress, “The pro-
competitive purposes of the AT&T consent decree have reinforced the pre-
divestiture Communications Act tradition of promoting affordable basic phone ser-
vice” (U.S. Congress 1990b, 304). 
However, the Bells were not satisfied simply offering “plain old telephone ser-
vice.”  Feeling the pressures of the industry, lobbyists urged Congress to permit 
entry into long-distance and video-service markets (Schiller 1999, 107). Looking 
down the road, telecommunication companies began speaking of an “information 
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age,” claiming that technological changes demanded that Congress lift the MFJ 
restrictions in order for RBOCs to remain competitive in a fast-changing industry. 
The “balkanization” of the Bell System made “harmonized action” nearly impossi-
ble within the industry, ultimately hindering the development of broadband for a 
social good (Schiller 1999, 106). The decade-long fight that ensued between 
AT&T, the RBOCs, and the new long distance operators prevented the establish-
ment of broadband as either a public utility or a highly regulated private utility. The 
poor execution of the divestiture pitted the CWA between AT&T and the RBOCs 
in the debate, forcing them to choose between supporting slightly different versions 
of policies that would eventually lead to a commercially-driven Internet. 
The CWA, however, did not pay a significant amount of attention to issues re-
garding new services in the immediate post-divestiture period. Instead, the CWA 
approached the fight over the MFJ on the front on which its restrictions impacted 
members’ most immediate interests—high-tech manufacturing. While the union 
initially worked to protect workers’ interests, defending AT&T against Baby Bell 
attempts to encroach on manufacturing, it eventually sided with the local providers, 
deciding that it was in the best interest of members to allow for greater competition, 
so long as it took place within the United States. 
The CWA maintained strong opposition to lifting MFJ restrictions on manufac-
turing during the first five years following the divestiture. Several Congressional 
bills were introduced throughout the mid- and late-1980s that would have allowed 
the companies to enter the manufacturing and information services. The union re-
peatedly spoke out against such changes on the Hill, arguing that Congress should 
mandate that Bell companies manufacture domestically if the restrictions were 
lifted. “The Congress must set conditions which make it impossible for foreign-
sourced goods to be labeled or considered ‘domestic’,” said Barbara Easterling be-
fore the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, adding that 
the Congress should distinguish between manufacturing and assembly, if the MFJ 
were to be lifted (U.S. Congress 1986, 168). 
However, by 1990, the CWA changed its tune, forming a general consensus 
with the RBOCs on scrapping the MFJ regulations. Testifying in favor of S. 1981, 
the Telecommunications Equipment Research and Manufacturing Act, Easterling 
told the Subcommittee on Communications that 150,000 jobs had been lost at 
AT&T and the seven RBOCs since the break-up. “The divestiture was an unwise 
action in that it fully opened the United States market without the necessary trade 
agreements to secure the full cash register ringing access to foreign markets,” ar-
gued Easterling. In order to remedy these problems, Easterling said that it was ap-
propriate to support the bill, because it would “allow the Bell operating companies 
to manufacture equipment domestically.”  The bill did not, however, explicitly pre-
vent manufacturing abroad—it simply did not explicitly encourage it. Easterling 
suggested additional measures to ban “‘Maquiladora’-style operations in Mexico, 
which have proven so popular among the Fortune 500 and AT&T” (U.S. Congress 
1990b, 289). 
While AT&T opposed the bill, avoiding competition in manufacturing from the 
RBOCs, BellSouth and its peers favored the legislation, calling it a “big step to-
ward a policy that serves America’s economic interests domestically and interna-
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tionally.”  BellSouth chairman John Clenendin argued that the MFJ was hindering 
technological progress and innovation. Calling it “out of sync with the realities of 
global commerce and the demands of an information economy,” Clenendin testified 
alongside Easterling in favor of Baby Bell entry into new sectors in order to remain 
competitive in a globalizing industry. Arguing that S. 1981 would promote the 
“general welfare,” he said that the debate about the MFJ went far beyond being a 
dispute between AT&T and the Bell holding companies. “If  S. 1981 becomes 
law,” Clenendin attested, “I am sure that contrary to what some have asserted, Bell-
South will continue to be one of AT&T’s largest customers” (U.S. Congress 1990b, 





In conjunction with the manufacturing controversy, the CWA wanted to ensure that 
the telecommunications industry remained a key player in the domestic economy, 
creating jobs and exporting products to the rest of the world. The breakup of AT&T 
spurred a trade deficit within the U.S. telecommunications industry. According to 
Bahr’s 1988 testimony, the industry ran a $900 million trade surplus in 1982, the 
year that the impending divestiture was announced. By 1988, that had turned into a 
$2.7 billion trade deficit (U.S. Congress 1988, 428). 
The perils facing the industry wrought by deregulation drove the CWA to lobby 
to protect the very industry that was badly hurting members’ livelihoods, ensuring 
that the US would remain competitive in telecom manufacturing. Throughout the 
period, CWA representatives went before House and Senate committees, support-
ing various bills that would have strengthened tariffs on imports and encouraged 
low tariffs on exports. In 1984, John Morgan, Assistant to the Executive Vice Presi-
dent, testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee sup-
porting a bill while arguing that many of its provisions needed to be strengthened 
by investing greater power in the executive branch to impose tariffs in order “to 
ensure that the United States retains a telecommunications manufacturing base; we 
have seen the unfortunate examples in shoes, color TVs, steel, autos and machine 
tools and do not want to see our industry similarly burdened as a result of our own 
government’s action” (U.S. Congress 1984, 27). Similarly an AT&T executive vice 
president supported the bill in order to promote open world trade in telecommuni-
cations equipment. However, rather than suspending all trade agreements, as the 
bill recommended, he argued that it “should allow a more focused approach aimed 
at negotiating new trade agreements” (U.S. Congress 1984, 33). Ironically, while 
seeking legislation to protect itself and help its markets, AT&T railed against non-
tariff trade barriers in developed countries such as local content requirements that 
impeded US business. While the CWA and AT&T had different ideas about modi-
fying the bill, they found themselves working towards the same end: protecting 
American telecom manufacturing at the expense of other nations developing their 
industries. 
Calling the AT&T divestiture “a unilateral giveaway of unlimited access to the 
United States market, without any kind of corresponding action to open other na-
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tions’ markets,” Morgan returned to the Senate, supporting the proposed Telecom-
munications Trade Act of 1985. AT&T claimed the bill “would take significant 
steps toward addressing the substantial trade barriers U.S. telecommunications 
companies face in their foreign marketing efforts” (U.S. Congress 1985, 239). The 
rest of the emerging U.S. telecom industry disagreed with the bill’s methods. 
Edwin Spievack, President to the North American Telecommunications Associa-
tion, argued, “protectionism would be catastrophic. Prices would rise for U.S. con-
sumers…And AT&T’s manufacturing monopoly would be reinstated.”  The other 
option, Spievack argued, was expanding export opportunities, which he said were 
not adequately addressed in the legislation, as it did not guarantee that American-
made products would be sold overseas (178). 
The CWA also came to support lowering trade barriers in other nations in order 
to expand US exports, thereby protecting jobs by strengthening American hegem-
ony within the industry. Testifying before Congress in 1987, Bahr offered union 
support to H.R. 3, which encouraged the United States to open international trade 
barriers to American telecom products. Bahr argued that the bill would “force our 
trading partners to play by fair rules and develop reciprocal trade practices.” Argu-
ing that American telecommunication workers had the ability to be productive due 
to their individual abilities, high levels of skills, and education, Bahr claimed that 
CWA members could compete with any workers in the world, if the policies were 
in place to encourage U.S. exports. He noted that the AT&T divestiture and deregu-
lation “were taken without a single thought to our international trade position. Be-
fore 1984, telecommunications was a uniquely American industry. Today, barely 
three years later, not a single residential telephone is made in America” (U.S. Con-
gress 1987b, 72). Later, CWA vice president James Irvine went on record to 
“support fair trade” and “oppose protectionism,” demanding that incentives be 
given to keep U.S. companies based within US borders. “We fear that the laissez-
faire trade policies of the 1980s will contribute to an even greater economic catas-
trophe [than the Great Depression] from which we may never recover. And tele-
communications, America’s so-called hi-tech industry of the future, will go the 
same way as our basic, manufacturing industry (176-7). 
Despite criticism of AT&T and the neoliberal approach, the industry also 
backed the legislation, as all were in general agreement about the need to encourage 
exports. “Liberalized interconnection rules, the AT&T divestiture and the creation 
of an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty within the industry have created a 
window of opportunity which our overseas competitors have successfully ex-
ploited,” stated Edward D. McKeever, vice president of AT&T International (U.S. 
Congress 1987a, 118). Spievack also supported the bill, calling it “seven years too 
late,” and arguing that it still needed to address deeper issues through anti-dumping 
laws, lifting restrictions on high-technology exports, and other legislative efforts to 




From Old to New Media 
 
Democratic Communiqué 22, No. 2, Fall 2008 74 
9
Dolber: A Rock and a Hard Place: The CWA’s Approach to Media Policy, 1984
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
Beginning in the 1980s, the popular press, business literature, and journalism all 
promoted the idea of an “information revolution” that would enable capital accu-
mulation and privatization efforts (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 21-2). For labor, though, 
these changes were widely viewed as an opportunity to create jobs in an expanding 
sector as industrial work was rapidly being exported to other corners of the world. 
Organized labor has typically affirmed dominant notions about expansion in infor-
mation technology, despite the fact that, for corporations, “information technology 
represents just another series of exchange-values which by no means correspond to 
real social needs” (Robins and Webster 1984, 202).   
By the 1990s, the CWA embraced the myth of the “information revolution,” in 
the lead up to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. While the MFJ prevented 
RBOCs from going into “information services,” the CWA saw the possibility for 
domestic job creation if this particular restriction was lifted. Unlike manufacturing, 
providing information services—going beyond POTS—could not be accomplished 
outside of U.S. borders. At the same time the CWA had come out in favor of relax-
ing manufacturing barriers, they came to support RBOC entry into new service 
markets. In 1990, Bahr told Congress to let “the BOCs enter the information ser-
vices business, since these companies have facilities and technical knowhow and 
the incentive to foster the ‘Information Age.’”  Despite opposition from media 
companies, the CWA contended that BOCs and other local exchange telephone 
companies should be allowed to provide cable TV services (U.S. Congress 1990a, 
167). 
In 1993, Easterling told the Senate that restrictions on telephone companies 
from entering the cable market were “anticompetitive” and encouraged the tele-
phone companies to “invest billions of dollars in foreign enterprise” (U.S. Con-
gress 1993, 224). While the CWA viewed this technological and economic 
change as aiding in the creation of union jobs, they located their position within the 
dominant rhetoric, highlighting the benefits of the information economy. Bahr testi-
fied in 1994 before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, calling market 
restrictions “out of date” due to convergence and new technologies. Affirming neo-
liberal notions of the benefits of a converged media system to the national and 
global economy, Bahr said that the union views 
 
the national information infrastructure proposals very positively 
in many respects. The NII will lead to the wider dissemination of 
knowledge and information and, we earnestly hope, to the crea-
tion of high-value, high-wage jobs. “Information superhighways” 
will play a pivotal role in providing a competitive advantage to 
our economy in the global marketplace. Our nation will benefit 
greatly by crafting a new policy framework to encourage the de-
velopment of our information superhighways as efficiently as 
possible (U.S. Congress 1994a, 697).  
 
In 1995, Easterling testified again, calling for “open entry to markets. Since the old 
‘boundaries’ of local exchange, long distance and cable TV have become so indis-
tinct as to have taken on an arbitrary quality, we believe the old restrictions should 
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be lifted” (U.S. Congress 1995, 335). However, Easterling did note that the CWA 
opposed “increasing the limits and thus adding to concentration of broadcast station 
ownership” (336). 
This approach to approving of an intensification of corporate control over com-
munication systems on the one hand, while advocating for diverse ownership on the 
other makes logical sense if we see the CWA’s primary objective as job creation 
for members. As capital was looking to converge, albeit with labor’s consent, un-
ions were beginning to respond, in order to protect jobs, wages and benefits within 
the culture industry. The consolidation of broadcast networks would not only be 
detrimental to the public, but would also make members of the recently-affiliated 
NABET vulnerable. Like the CWA itself, NABET has a long history of compro-
mise and has suffered from lack of unity, a weak economic position, and narrow 
goals (Wasko 1983, 105). 
The affiliation of TNG did not guarantee that the CWA would develop a sub-
stantially broader view of media policy. Unable to stand on its own in opposition to 
the fast-changing newspaper industry, TNG had long sought a merger with a larger 
union, and wanted to ensure a separate culture from the rest of the CWA. Like 
other unions, they had suffered during the Reagan-era, and had been forced to pro-
tect basic economic interests, unable to take a more proactive, social unionist ap-
proach (McKercher 2002). 
Testifying on telecommunications legislation, consumer activist Ralph Nader in 
1994 told Congress that “information is more than a commodity, it is the way we 
learn, persuade and communicate, we believe that competition in content markets 
should be a paramount goal in a democratic society” (U.S. Congress 1994b, 370-1). 
While the CWA’s expansion deeper into the culture industry sector has made it 
increasingly interested in issues of media diversity, and vocal on reform, it has not 
adopted such an overarching theory of media’s role in society or the impact of com-
mercial media on workers that dictates media and telecommunication policy posi-
tions. This became most apparent in the union’s position on the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, and has persisted since. 
 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996   
 
In March 1996, the CWA News boasted, “With President Morton Bahr and Secre-
tary-Treasurer Barbara Easterling nearby, President Clinton on February 8 changed 
the course of telecommunications history with the stroke of a pen when he signed 
into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”  Easterling claimed that the bill 
“marks a new era.”  Within that single month, the News reported that “a torrent of 
activity” had taken place: Baby Bell U.S. West announced plans to purchase Conti-
nental Cablevision, while AT&T and MCI began talking about competing against 
RBOCs as local carriers. The News also reported criticisms of the bill coming from 
the Consumers Federation of America and the ACLU, two historical allies of the 
labor movement in media reform struggles (CWA News 1996a, 3). 
The CWA took a “cautious approach” to the legislation. On the one hand, sup-
porters of the bill promised to meet the union’s immediate economic needs by cre-
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ating 21st century jobs. Democratic congressman Rick Boucher called it the “largest 
jobs creation measure of the first four years of the Clinton administration,” expect-
ing to generate 3.5 million new jobs in telecom and $400 billion investment in ca-
ble and infrastructure for TV. In a 1997 resolution, the union stated that they sup-
ported the law, expecting it to “expand access to advanced telecommunications 
services through lower prices, stimulate investment in new facilities and equipment, 
improve service quality, speed deployment of new telecommunications technolo-
gies, and promote the growth of good jobs in the industry” (CWA Executive Board 
1997). However, much was left unknown. The News argued that while the act was 
“hailed… as a as a harbinger of jobs…[a] number of issues for workers and con-
sumers remain unresolved as local, long distance, and cellular telephone companies 
and broadcast, cable TV and Internet providers prepare to compete head on” (CWA 
News 1996a, 10). 
Leading up to the act’s passage, media reform advocates expected that the De-
mocratic Clinton-Gore administration would work to develop an Internet that en-
couraged media diversity and access to information, washing away many of the 
problems associated with corporate-controlled “old media.”  Surrounded by excite-
ment about a world interconnected by an information superhighway, however, the 
act changed the logic of regulation within the communication industries, with virtu-
ally no dissent coming from either political party. The law now claimed that greater 
control over the majority of the nation’s media by a few companies was in the pub-
lic interest (Chester 2007, 17, 41). 
To a great extent, the CWA perpetuated the dominant mythology with the ex-
pectation that the bill would create jobs. Despite their mixed reaction to the final 
bill, the union heralded the liberatory power of communications technology, argu-
ing that regulations were stifling innovation and damaging the national economy. 
As they reported in the CWA News, the expected growth in the communications, 
information, and entertainment sectors 
 
has big, strong, profitable corporations prepared to crawl around 
on their hands and knees to get a piece of the action. For CWA 
members and potential members, the revolution means jobs. For 
America’s children and future generations, the revolution could 
spell the difference between prosperity and poverty… (CWA 
News 1995a, 6). 
 
The union offered members an optimistic look at changes in the media and commu-
nications industries, and presented itself as the labor organization of the future. On 
the eve of the TNG-CWA merger, for example, a News article in 1995 reported  
 
the future of work may be brighter than ever, although there will 
be massive changes and greater challenges than ever to organize 
the unorganized. As the world becomes more and more wired (or, 
in the case of the telephone, perhaps less wired) the need for in-
formation gatherers, editors, and writers and other to deliver the 
product will greatly expand. “Newspapers will exist,” [TNG 
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President Linda] Foley says, “both as a product you can hold and 
also on the Internet, the information highway.” … We are rapidly 
moving into a single information industry, speeded along by the 
convergence of telecommunications, the print and broadcast me-
dia, cable TV and entertainment (CWA News 1995b, 6).   
  
In addition, the CWA News touted the Internet as a new organizing tool in NA-
BET’s contract fight with NBC. Showcasing the power of the web, NABET-CWA 
Local 41 President Ray Taylor told the News, “NBC’s been unable to capitalize on 
their network ratings success, because their local news has not been able to catch 
up.”  From their perspective, the brave new world the union was entering provided 
great opportunities for all (CWA News 1995c, 7). 
The only casualty in the information age, repeatedly referred to by the CWA, 
would be those who remained unconnected. Warning of the possibility of a division 
of society into “information haves and have-nots,” Bahr told the Social Democrats 
USA in 1995 that “[w]ithout pressure from labor, consumer groups and govern-
ment, the information superhighway will be driven solely by the profit motive—
and such competitive markets are unfair in distributing information” (CWA News 
1995b, 6). Thus, build-out and universal service requirements—both of which 
would expand job opportunities—became key legislative concerns for the union 
(U.S. Congress 1995). 
The union was not completely blind to the undemocratic ways in which capital 
sought to implement new technologies. Discussing the development of CWA con-
vergence councils to examine the commonalities among media and telecommunica-
tions workers in the burgeoning environment, Bahr, who sat on Vice President 
Gore’s influential Council on the National Information Infrastructure, noted, 
 
Vice President Al Gore has stated his dream this way—that one 
day a child in Carthage, Tenn. will be able to access information 
in the Library of Congress from his or her home computer. This 
is in contrast to the shallow dream of the phone company execu-
tive who sees a mini-movie theater in every living room in Amer-
ica (Keefe and Batt 1997, 58; CWA News 1996b, 2). 
 
Thus, Gore connected information and modernization, and promoted the myth that 
the Internet would bring “robust and sustainable economic progress, strong democ-
racies, better solutions to global and local environmental challenges, improved 
health care, and—ultimately—a greater sense of shared stewardship of our small 
planet” (Mosco 2004, 38-39). Rather than challenge this propagandistic discourse, 
the CWA formed a consensus with the state and capital on the benefits of network 
development. 
Without presenting a formidable challenge to the Telecom Act, the CWA con-
sented to the Internet’s for-profit development. The act brought an end to the regu-
lations imposed by the 1984 divestiture. In addition, Section 202(h), proposed by 
Rupert Murdoch, specified that the FCC had to review media ownership restrictions 
every two years, and determine “whether any of the ownership rules …are neces-
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sary in the public interest” as a result of the new “competition” (Chester 2007, 42-
43). Despite CWA’s attempts to address the needs of workers in a converged media 
industry, their main focus had seemingly not shifted from securing short-term gains 
for workers in the telecommunications sector. While even in a best-case scenario, 
the bill would have created jobs for telecom workers, it placed the positions of 
other union members in jeopardy, particularly those belonging to TNG and NA-
BET, running counter to the CWA’s “major strategic goal”: “Wall-to-Wall organi-
zation within the information industry” (Keefe and Batt 1997, 58). 
 
 
Mergers, Acquisitions and the New Media Environment (1996-
2002) 
 
The Telecommunications Act not only damaged the livelihood of culture industry 
workers, but also presented a challenge to the development of democratic media. In 
the following years, the U.S. telecom and media landscapes changed dramatically. 
Squabbles developed between long distance carriers and local telephone compa-
nies, and cable and satellite broadcasters, before the FCC and the Justice Depart-
ment in efforts to obtain the most favorable regulations (McChesney 2000, 66). In 
addition, the lifting of MFJ restrictions did not spur local-exchange carrier entry 
into the information service and video provision markets. Instead, local carriers 
could not meet the expense of residential network modernization and put inclusive 
broadband access on hold. Long distance companies faced the choice of either buy-
ing local network capacity or creating their own parallel local networks at a high 
cost (Schiller 1999, 107). Thus, the CWA reported in 2001 that the law had allowed 
most residential and small business consumers to benefit from stable local rates and 
declining long distance rates, while monopoly cable rates climbed more than 30 
percent. “Downward competitive pressures” had hurt telephone workers, “the roll-
out of cable telephony has been plagued with problems,” and broadband deploy-
ment remained slow and sporadic (Goldman 2001). 
Telecom was not the only area affected by the act. The new law led to further 
convergence between telecom and old media sectors. Almost all the major media 
firms, including Time Warner, Disney and News Corporation quickly allied with 
telecom and software firms, culminating in the $160 billion AOL-Time Warner 
merger in January 2000. The short-lived AT&T-TCI merger of this period gave the 
phone company “interests in a large stable of media assets,” but eventually TCI 
became part of the anti-union Comcast. 
In addition to new media, the 1996 Act also changed old media structures. Ra-
dio came to look drastically different. With relaxed ownership restrictions, allowing 
one firm to own up to eight stations in a single market, a few massive chains came 
to quickly dominate the entire industry. FCC extensions of relaxed ownership re-
strictions, in accord with the act, paved the way for consolidation in television 
(McChesney 2000, 75-6). In essence, the Telecomunications Act solidified the neo-
liberal project’s presence in media policy making by establishing “that the private 
sector would determine the future of US electronic media and digital communica-
tion” (128). 
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The CWA had inadvertently consented to the systematic exclusion of labor and 
other components of civil society from media policy making. In the tumultuous 
years following the act, CWA frequently spoke out against changes in the telecom-
munication industry, pressuring the FCC to block several major mergers. In Febru-
ary 1998 the CWA filed charges with the FCC in an attempt to block the merger 
between MCI and WorldCom, calling it “anti-competitive as defined by the Tele-
communications Act and the FCC’s public interest guidelines” (CWA News 
1998c). President Bahr noted that this merger would allow the company to control 
“more than 60 percent of the Internet backbone the key to the communications in-
frastructure” (CWA News 1998b). The CWA News also reported the European 
Commission’s decision to require MCI to sell its Internet assets as a condition of its 
merger, in conjunction with the union’s efforts to block the merger on the other 
side of the Atlantic (CWA News 1998a). 
However, the CWA did not take the position that mergers in the telecom indus-
try were categorically harmful. Instead, the union portrayed itself as agreeable to 
consolidation so long as the corporations were not explicitly anti-union, allowing 
organization within the workplace. Viewing political action as one part of making 
shop floor gains, alongside bargaining and organizing, the CWA decided it was in 
members’ best interests to support mergers among the RBOCs, helping them com-
pete against large global corporations, such as AT&T, Sprint, WorldCom-MCI, and 
various foreign-based international carriers (Katz, et al 2003, 582). In the wake of 
the announced AT&T-SBC merger, Bahr outlined his goal in the CWA News: wall-
to-wall organization. “Memo to industry: Make no mistake—that is our goal for the 
entire industry, sooner rather than later” (CWA News 1997, 2). In addition, the 
CWA spoke out against AT&T’s plans to split into four companies, under the logic 
that it would disrupt the possibility of bundled services, as the News mourned the 
potential loss of a consumer’s utopia in 2001. 
 
Imagine being able to deal with your long distance phone com-
pany, your cable service, your wireless provider—maybe your 
local phone company, too—in a single telephone call. One stop 
shopping, with a minimum of canned music. That’s the direction 
AT&T had been heading over the past two years, spending $110 
billion to buy cable, wireless, and local phone company access to 
become a multi-service provider (CWA News 2001, 5). 
 
Later, in 2002, the CWA announced its support of cable provider Comcast’s deci-
sion to purchase AT&T Broadband, claiming that “workers would gain greater op-
portunity under the merged company, including a more positive labor relations ap-
proach.” (Northwest Labor Press 2002). For the CWA international leadership, “big 
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larly the telecommunication companies. Although the CWA joined the CIO in the 
1940s, its pre-history as an amalgamation of company unions provided it with a 
very different history than other industrial unions of the era. The advantages of 
working in a highly regulated industry during the postwar era did not adequately 
prepare the union to deal with the shock it would be delivered in the neoliberal age. 
Rather than rethinking the Fordist labor-capital alliance in light of the AT&T dives-
titure, the CWA continued to promote communications policies that would benefit 
employers in order to advance short-term organizing goals. 
While the first five years following the divestiture saw the CWA maintain its 
allegiance to Ma Bell, the union repositioned its policy goals in alignment with the 
RBOCs by 1990, supporting the MFJ repeal in order to expand jobs in the manu-
facturing sector. There is little evidence that concerns regarding the implications of 
“competition” in broadband, video and other services were taken into considera-
tion. This approach culminated in the union’s general support for the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, when the CWA replicated the utopian rhetoric around con-
vergence, the Internet, and the “information age.” 
The importance of pursuing short-term organizing goals should not be dimin-
ished. Since the 1980s, unions have had to fight against the rollback of New Deal-
era protections and the implementation of neoliberal trade deals. While politicians, 
executives, and union leaders have hailed telecommunications as the industry of the 
future, CWA members have endured lost jobs and broken promises. The immediate 
needs which the CWA and other unions fight for, such as health care, pensions and 
job security, must not be overlooked. 
However, the contradiction between short-term interests and a broader long-
term vision for communication and culture is illusory. An examination of the social 
unionism of the CWA’s early CIO sister unions might be instructive in reshaping 
its lobbying efforts in order to challenge the neoliberal order in an era of conver-
gence, consolidation and new media. Such an approach is already being taken by 
CWA affiliates such as TNG, to the extent that they may within the CWA’s frame-
work. The CWA as a whole has yet to embrace this view fully in developing its 
lobbying strategy. While its historical trajectory has often placed the CWA along-
side its employers in legislative efforts, alternative paths do exist from within the 
union’s own tradition. These might be followed to develop new strategies, and ulti-
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